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Volume 2, Number 20 (November 6, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Personnel rumors  
Reports are surfacing that some former influential Kremlin personnel will once 
again appear in the government or presidential administrations. Sergei Shakhrai, 
currently the president's representative to the Constitutional Court, and Vladimir 
Shumeiko are reported to be expecting governmental posts and the responsibility 
for redefining the relationship between the regions and the federal center. 
(Delovoy mir, 14 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-300) 
 
There are also an abundance of reports that the controversial former FSB Chief 
Mikhail Barsukov will soon receive an appointment to head up a special projects 
department within the Presidential Administration. (Kommersant Daily, 17 Oct 97; 
NEXIS) This department, formerly the KGB 15th Directorate, is responsible for 
the oversight of underground special and communications facilities. 
(Komsomolskaya pravda, 25 Oct 97; NEXIS) 
 
In other personnel news, it appears that Lt. Gen. Viktor Zavarzin will be 
appointed as Russia's military envoy to NATO, a position believed coveted by 
former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. (Interfax, 20 Oct 97, FBIS-SOV-97-293) 
Zavarzin served previously as the commander of CIS Joint Peacekeeping Forces 
on Tajikistan. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Council restructuring, restaffing approved 
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The Security Council has undergone a thorough restructuring of its network of 
interdepartmental commissions as well as a personnel shuffle that reflects the 
changes made to the government and presidential apparat in the course of the 
past year and a half. Several chairmen who had been in their positions since the 
creation of their commissions, such as Ecological Security Chief Yablokov, have 
been removed to make room for new or more prominent government figures. 
Among the new chairmen are Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov in a new 
Commission on International Security; Justice Minister Sergei Stepashin heads 
up a new Commission on Constitutional Security; and NDR Duma Deputy 
Aleksandr Shokhin at the Commission for Economic Security. In addition to the 
newly-created commissions mentioned above, there are two other new 
commissions: one on the protection of the rights of citizens, public safety, crime 
and corruption to be headed by General Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov; and a 
commission on problems of the Defense Industry, chaired by Deputy Prime 
Minister Yakov Urinson. (Presidential Edict No. 1024, dated 10 July 96, in 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 2 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-289) 
 
In other Security Council news, it appears that issues of military reform will now 
be coordinated jointly by the Security Council and the Defense Council. SC 
Secretary Ivan Rybkin and DC Secretary Andrei Kokoshin met and agreed 
recently to cooperate on military reform, particularly the economic aspects. 
(Rossiyskiye vesti, 22 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-295) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Abdulatipov's responsibilities increased 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, the government liaison for Chechnya, has recently had 
his portfolio expanded to include responsibilities in other regional relations. 
Abdulatipov will now head the government commission tasked with ensuring 
delivery of goods to the Far North, the Commission for State Support of the 
Development of Russia's Regions, the Consultative Council for the Affairs of 
National-Cultural Autonomies and the council responsible for the demarcation of 
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areas of jurisdiction between the federal authorities and the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia). (Rossiyskiye vesti, 17 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-290) It appears that 
despite his clashes with SC Secretary Rybkin, Abdulatipov retains the confidence 
of the prime minister in negotiating regional affairs. 
 
Chernomyrdin hints at Duma dissolution background 
In an interview with Yevgeni Kiselev from Itogi (NTV, 19 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
302), Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin distanced himself from the "young 
people and the not-so-young, the reformers" in the government who wanted "to 
encourage the Duma to act, so that they can work later with another Duma, ... 
one that is more loyal to the government...." His statements provide further 
evidence that there was at least a faction within the government hoping to 
provoke the Duma into no-confidence votes, thereby triggering the president's 
constitutional means of dissolving the Duma. 
 
Chernomyrdin also revealed more of his political sympathies than has been 
evident since the ascendence of the Chubais and Nemtsov reform teams. As has 
long been speculated, Chernomyrdin may be more comfortable negotiating with 
the Communists than with liberal reformers. In regard to the recent conflict 
between the Duma and government, Chernomyrdin remarked "I will never agree 
with Yavlinsky's position and others and so on. I can work with Seleznev." 
 
Justice Minister Stepashin to head joint commission on extremism 
Sergei Stepashin has been named "Coordinator" of a new presidential 
commission tasked with developing "measures to prevent and stop political 
extremism aimed at changing the foundations of the constitutional system by 
force and violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining the 
security of the state, and kindling social, racial, ethnic and religious strife." 
(Presidential Decree No. 1143, 27 Oct 97; NEXIS) Joining Stepashin on the 
commission are MVD Chief Kulikov, FSB Head Kovalev, members of the 
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presidential administration (including Yevgeni Savostyanov), as well as 
representatives from the Federation Council and State Duma. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
As tensions mount, Russia abstains on new UN sanctions against Iraq 
As the United States threatened military strikes to protect its efforts to inspect 
Iraq's weapons production, Russia abstained from UN Security Council votes on 
tough new UN sanctions against Baghdad. 
 
Russia was joined in abstaining by China, France, Egypt and Kenya. The 
resulting 10-0 vote meant the sanctions, which ban travel abroad by selected 
Iraqi officials, passed by the narrowest possible margin. (Interfax, 1552 GMT, 24 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-297) 
 
Analyzing international business deals with Baghdad, the newspaper 
Rossiyskaya gazeta concluded that Russian oil firms are "now ahead of their 
competitors in reestablishing ties to Iraq." A Russian consortium has, for 
example, concluded a $3.8 billion contract to develop the Western Qurnah oil 
field. 
 
"The Russian oil companies' activity in the Iraqi market supported at a state level 
indicates that Russia has probably started to meld the geopolitical aspirations of 
the state and the commercial interests of major companies in the Persian Gulf 
Region," the paper concluded. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 22 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
297) 
 
Primakov tour aimed to secure Moscow's "central role" in Middle East 
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Touring five nations of the Middle East and the Palestinian "self-rule" territories, 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov promised to strengthen Moscow's 
position as a "co-sponsor" of the region's peace negotiations. In a dramatic turn 
of shuttle diplomacy, Primakov acted as a liaison between the Syrian and Israeli 
governments, and appeared to have secured his role as a major player in the 
region. 
 
The highlight of Primakov's tour was an impromptu turn as go-between from 
Damascus to Tel Aviv. Although shrouded in secrecy, it appears that Primakov 
brought to Israel a message from Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, in which Asad 
made an overture to open new negotiations on the status of the Golan Heights. 
 
At a press conference following his meetings with Asad, Primakov hinted that he 
had attempted to open the "Syrian-Israel" track of the Madrid accords. "There are 
people who think that one can proceed along only one track, for example the 
Palestinian one," Primakov said. "But if the Syrian track is blocked, the whole 
peace process in the region will be stopped." (ITAR-TASS, 1458 GMT, 26 Oct 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-299) 
 
After finishing subsequent meetings with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, 
Primakov said Levy had asked him to return to Damascus, rather than continue 
on to Jordan, in order to convey a message to Asad from the Israeli government. 
Israel reportedly wanted to express an interest in re-opening peace talks with 
Syria, in exchange for a Syrian promise to curb attacks on Israel launched from 
southern Lebanon by the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah. (ITAR-TASS, 
1706 GMT, 27 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-300) 
 
Russia to help Libya overhaul nuclear research center, other projects 
Russia has agreed to allow scientists to consult with their Libyan counterparts on 
the overhaul of the Gazhura (name as received) Nuclear Research Center, as 
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well as other civil engineering projects, according to Sergei Shoygu, Russia's 
Minister for Emergency Situations. 
 
Tripoli and Moscow will establish a joint investment company and bank to finance 
the projects, and hope to settle Libya's $2.4 billion debt, which Russia inherited 
from the former Soviet Union. (Interfax, 1100 GMT, 22 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
295) 
 
Russia lobbies Austria, Hungary not to join NATO... 
On a state visit to Vienna, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin praised 
Austrian neutrality as a model for future European relations, and implored 
Austrian President Viktor Klima not to seek NATO membership. 
 
"Russia favors the Austrian stance" on European security issues, Chernomyrdin 
said. "Ever since the end of World War Two Austria has been a neutral country 
and it has only gained by this," he said. The body most likely to emulate the 
Austrian stance, Chernomyrdin said, was the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
Russia intends to cooperate actively with NATO on the consolidation of the 
European security, Chernomyrdin said, but "we will never agree that the 
expansion of NATO is needed now, since its doctrine of confrontation with the 
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and, consequently, Russia has not essentially 
changed," he said. (Interfax, 1628 GMT, 29 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-302) 
 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Valeri Nesterushkin also praised alternatives to 
NATO expansion as a future basis for European security. He praised the 
Hungarian organization "A Public Coalition for a Policy in the Name of Man" for 
asking the Russian leadership to declare that it would guarantee Hungary's 
neutrality if that country does not join NATO. (Interfax, 1343 GMT, 28 Oct 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-301) 
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...while Duma leaders complain to President Clinton 
The chairmen of Duma committees on October 16th sent an open letter to US 
President Bill Clinton agreeing with American pundits who opposed NATO 
expansion. 
 
The process of expanding the alliance eastward "will indeed weaken the entire 
international security system and undermine strategic stability," the letter stated. 
"Mr. President, it is evident from the above-mentioned appeal that your 
compatriots are reasonably asking questions about the aims, possible 
consequences, and price of the alliance's planned eastward expansion." 
 
The good faith of the letter's signatories was bright into question, however, by a 
number of questionable historical judgments. Not only, the signatories affirmed, 
did Russia pose no threat to the West since the end of the Cold War; the authors 
insisted that "it did not pose one previously either." The "new and truly artificial 
line" to be drawn in Europe as a result of NATO expansion was, the signatories 
believed, particularly unjust, since the preceding line of the Iron Curtain "was 
fairly established on the basis of the results of World War II, in which the Soviet 
Union is well known to have played a decisive liberating role." (Sovetskaya 
Rossiya, 16 Oct 97; Johnson's Russia List #1304). 
 
Russia to provide India with weapons technology, support bid for UN seat 
Relations between India and Russia continue to improve. In Moscow, Indian 
Defense Minister Mulayam Singh secured pledges of long-term cooperation in 
the modernization of weapons based on Russian technology, as well as Indo-
Russian cooperation in the development of new systems. At the talks, Russian 
President Boris Yel'tsin also promised to prevent future arms sales to Pakistan. 
(The Pioneer, 22 Oct 97; FBIS-NES-97-296) 
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The Russian ambassador to New Delhi also promised Moscow's support for 
India's bid to gain a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. The 
pledge came as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Kulikov was in India to 
discuss cooperation in fighting drug trafficking. (Deccan Herald (Internet version), 
17 Oct 97; FBIS-NES-97-290) 
 
Russia and China to finish drawing border before Yel'tsin visits Beijing 
Moscow and Beijing plan to complete the demarcation of their 2,580-mile border 
in the run-up to the Russian president's scheduled visit to China over November 
9-11. 
 
Work on establishing the border, ongoing since 1992, is complete but for 
agreement on two strips of land near Vladivostock. Although some regional 
leaders in Russia believe these areas have been transferred to China at the 
expense of Russian security, spokesmen in Moscow said the government would 
ignore such complaints. 
 
Agreement of the border is a critical step in the improvement of Sino-Russian 
relations, and helps to secure the "strategic partnership" pronounced during the 
visit of Chinese president Jiang Zemin to Moscow in April. (Reuters, 21 Oct 97; 
Johnson's Russia List #1304) 
 
Comment 
Primakov's Mid-east maneuvers 
By attempting to re-open the "Syrian-Israeli" track of the Middle East peace 
process, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov has tried to score a major 
diplomatic victory. As the point man between Damascus and Tel Aviv, Primakov 
now would have had a monopoly on an aspect of Arab-Israeli negotiations 
concerning which the White House has not, so far, been successful. 
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One must admire Primakov's strategy. He tried to secure this roost for Moscow 
due to his government's ties to Iran, the backers of the Syrian-based Hezbollah, 
which has harrassed Israel from the north. By securing a friendship with Iran, 
then traveling to Syria, Primakov has positioned himself as patron of both the 
government that backs Hezbollah and the government that offers it a home. 
 
This is not to say that Primkov is acting in the best interests of peace. Re-
opening the Syrian-Israeli track of negotiations wouldn't guarantee a just 
settlement. It is, however, a means by which Russia can counter America's 
attempts to build an alliance between Turkey and Israel, and thus can put Russia 
right back at the heart of Middle East talks. The only good news is that the 
Iranian-Syrian "track" is hardly compatible with Primakov's ardent support of Iraq, 
Iran's and Syria's adversary. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Communist Duma candidate wins in Stavropol district 
Elections in the Stavropol region for State Duma deputies for the Georgiyevsky 
Electoral District resulted in victory for Communist candidate Ivan Meshcherin. 
The local popularity of Zyuganov meant that the election results surprised no 
one. According to the leaders of the CPRF kray committee, one-third of all the 
kray organization Communists live in Georgiyevsky District and the Communists 
pulled out all the stops in campaigning for their candidate. But the strong support 
Meshcherin received in the rural districts may have had less to do with political 
ideology than it did with Meshcherin's position as director of the Pravokumskoye 
Agricultural Enterprise. According to Rossiyskaya gazeta, Meshcherin is 
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recognized by the region's voters as being an effective business manager and 
thus well-qualified for the job of Duma deputy. 
 
Meshcherin received 43.9 percent of the vote. Colonel Nikolai Lyashenko, the 
former Budennovsk police chief, came in second. Lyashenko represented the 
Congress of Russian Communities. Turnout was less than 31 percent 
(Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-259). 
 
Yel'tsin supports importance of local government 
At a session of the Council for Local Government, which the president chairs, 
Yel'tsin pointed to the need for financial stability within the regions. He said that 
"consolidation" of local government does not pose a threat to the federal 
structure of Russia. This is in opposition to the remarks made State Duma 
Chairman Gennadi Seleznev, who believes that the region's governors were 
given too much power, and that, as a result, Russia may be turned into a 
confederation. 
 
Yel'tsin's position is in keeping with his continuing courtship of the regions. By 
supporting the regional and local government at the possible expense of the 
center, Yel'tsin may be realizing that elections are won outside of the Beltway -- 
or rather Sadovoye Ring Road, (ITAR-TASS, 0954 GMT, 30 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-273) 
 
MEDIA 
All-Russian TV and radio chairman Nikolai Svanidze interview  
Svanidze pointed out that conflicts between private and public broadcasting 
stations are resolved privately and away from the legal system due to an 
"unwritten" agreement. No explanation was given as to what this agreement 
might mean. However Svanidze was quite frank when he confirmed that 
"[e]verybody knows that NTV is controlled by Vladimir Gusinskiy and ORT 
[Russian Public Television] mainly by Boris Berezovskiy." He noted that "this 
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naturally affects their [the media outlets] actions, especially where Russia's 
finances are concerned. If a financial organization or a major financier has clout 
on a certain channel, it is difficult to keep from not using this enormous cannon in 
the interests of that financial structure." 
 
However, when asked about the ownership of his own media organization, 
Svanidze denied that his programming was influenced by the state, or more 
specifically Anatoli Chubais. Svanidze claimed that Chubais was simply too busy 
to concern himself with the operations of a TV and radio station (Argumenty i 
fakty No. 39, September 1997; FBIS-SOV-97-267) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Yel'tsin's legislative record assessed 
Aleksandr Kotenkov, the president's representative in the State Duma, said that 
the president has submitted about 200 bills during the entire existence of the 
State Duma -- most of them to the Duma of the previous session. One hundred 
of these bills were not were not even examined. With such legislative 
intransigence on the part of the Duma, it is no wonder that the Russian 
Federation continues to be ruled by presidential edicts and decrees. If the Duma 
were to improve drastically its legislative efficiency, it might be able to make a 
case that rule by decree is undemocratic. But until this happens, the everyday 
needs of the world's largest country will have to be addressed by executive fiat. 
(Rossiyskiye vesti, 29 Sep 97; FBIS-SOV-97-268) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Russia fully engaged in world arms market growth 
According to figures released by the London International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS), the world arms market grew by 8 percent in arms deliveries from 
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1995 to 1996, amounting to nearly $40 billion (constant 1995 prices). The 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) stated in its SIPRI-97 
Annual Report that Russia held second place in terms of world arms exports, 
accounting for approximately 20 percent of world-wide arms exports. 
A significant and growing region for arms importing is East and Southeast Asia. 
Annual growth in defense expenditures of the ASEAN member countries is 
projected at a level of six percent, making the area ripe for arms sales. Russia 
has now made considerable sales in these countries, historically a US market, 
marked by the 1994 sale of 18 MiG-29s to Malaysia for a reported $600 million. 
On 17 October, a $34.4 million modernization contract for the MiGs was signed. 
The modernization effort will include mid-air refueling capability, increased 
payload, and arming with the newest Russian air-to-air missiles RVV-AE which 
has a range of 50 kilometers. This missile system gives multiple launching and 
reaim-during-flight capabilities. (ITAR-TASS, 0841 GMT, 17 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-290) This is the latest example of Russia's willingness to market leading 
quality products. 
 
Other sales in this region include six Su-27s (worth $180 million) in 1995 to 
Vietnam with plans to buy another 24 aircraft for approximately $800 million, as 
well as 12 Su-30K fighters and eight Mi-17-1B helicopters to Indonesia this past 
August. Talks are underway with Burma for MiG-29s and Mi-35 helicopters. In 
addition, the MiG-29 is to partcipate in an upcoming Phillipine competition. 
(Delovoy mir, 22 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-301) 
 
While Russia appears to be pursuing aggressively the arms export market, there 
have been some troubles. Ukraine has continued to stand as a direct competitor 
to Russia as witnessed by the $650 million contract with Pakistan for 320 T-
80UD tanks. Progress on that contract was discussed on 22 October in Kiev with 
a Pakistani delegation. Though Ukraine has the manufacturing facilities, many 
components currently must be supplied by Russia. Ukraine is apparently seeking 
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other sources to ensure implementation of the contract. (NTV, 0800 GMT, 21 Oct 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-295) 
 
Influence by the US is being blamed for Thailand's withdrawal of tender for a 
Russian armored personnel carrier (APC). The Russian military attache in 
Thailand announced on 23 October that Thai military officials had yielded to US 
pressure to refuse a contract with Russia and substitute a US APC as a finalist in 
the competition. (ITAR-TASS, 1808 GMT, 23 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-296) 
 
While arms exports appear to be on the increase for Russia overall, Russian 
Defense Minister Sergeev repeated his warning on 15 October that the reform of 
the Russian armed forces must included a "cardinal reorganization of the military-
industrial complex." He says that there are too great of reserves in the defense 
industrial complex and that the 1998 budget can only fund 780,000 workers 
versus the 2.5 million currently employed. He stated that Russia cannot afford 37 
aircraft-building enterprises, citing the six types of fighters currently being 
developed in Russia as compared to the US's two and Western Europe's one. 
While the privatization of Russia's defense industry continues, we can expect to 
see massive consolidation not unlike the mergers that have occurred in the past 
three years in the US defense industry. (Interfax, 0635 GMT, 15 Oct 97; FBIS-
SOV-97-288) 
 
Mir to be de-orbited in 1999 
The general director of the Russian Space Agency announced the Mir space 
station would be de-orbited and allowed to disintegrate in the atmosphere 
towards the end of 1999. The breaking phase of Mir's orbit will be designed to 
allow the space station to break up and burn up over the ocean. While the end of 
Mir is now in sight, Russian work on its portions of the Alpha international space 
station appear to be on track. Although many portions of the Russian space 
program are poorly financed, Russian Space Agency officials announced that 
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government funding of the Alpha modules was adequate. A December 1998 
launch is planned. (Agence France-Presse, 23 Oct 97, 29 Oct 97; clari.net) 
 
Pacific shipyard woes 
The Russian Navy refloated a decommissioned nuclear submarine which sank at 
its berth at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky on 29 May 1997. A dozen aging 
decommissioned submarines are awaiting destruction but so far only two have 
been cut up because of funding shortfalls. Rear Admiral Alexander Nescheret, 
commander of the Petropavlovsk submarine flotilla, said the federal government 
program to dismantle former warships was "coming apart in practice." (Agence 
France-Presse, 23 Oct 97; clari.net) 
 
The admiral's comments come as 500 workers at a submarine maintenance 
facility in Vladivostok appealed to Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto for aid. In 
the letter to the prime minister, the workers stated the government arrears to the 
plant forced the layoff of 60 percent of the workforce and warned of a possible 
ecological disaster if the Russian government did not act. (Agence France-
Presse, 30 Oct 97; clari.net) 
 
Strategic forces modernization planned 
Russia's defense ministry plans to purchase six TU-160 "Blackjack" strategic 
bombers from the Kazan Aircraft Production Association, the head of the Tupolev 
organization reported. The six planes were still in the production pipeline when 
President Yel'tsin halted new production in January 1992. Five aircraft are 
already ready for delivery and the sixth was still in construction. Russia currently 
has six "Blackjack" bombers in its airforce inventory; Ukraine inherited 19 of the 
planes from the Soviet Union. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 29 Oct 97) 
 
In other strategic news, commanders of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and 
the United States Strategic Command have agreed to an exchange program 
where personnel from one country will work with their counterparts for one week. 
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Each "shadow" team will include a range of ranks. (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 30 Oct 97) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
CIS summit: Much to do about nothing 
Those expecting great progress or sweeping change from the CIS Heads of 
State meeting were predictably disappointed. At least at past summits the 
leaders signed some documents and made some resolutions. During this 
conference, however, not one document was signed, not one conflict was 
resolved, and no agenda was followed. All the work done by the subordinate 
councils seems to have been for nothing. 
 
As in the past, some leaders came to the meeting pushing for increased 
economic and political integration. Some sought only to improve economic 
relations, and still others opposed any strengthening of the CIS structures. There 
were leaders who accused Russia of undermining the commonwealth by refusing 
to treat member states as equals. Others believed that the formation of unions, 
namely the Belarus-Russian Union and the Customs Union, hurt the organization 
because they provide a "multi-tracked" system of integration. By the time the 
conference ended, no leaders changed their fundamental position on the state of 
the commonwealth. 
 
Some reports indicate that there was a good deal of heated discussion and name 
calling at the closed-doors sessions. Presidents Shevardnadze and Yel'tsin 
admitted as much in their post-summit news conference. Yel'tsin said Russia was 
"singled out" and received the majority of the criticism. 
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The one thing the leaders did agree on was the fact that the council was 
incapable of implementing the decisions it makes. To remedy this, President 
Yel'tsin suggested strengthening the secretariat and reorganizing the 
bureaucracy. Strangely enough, most of the "reforms" are actually components 
of the CIS charter. Yel'tsin called for rotating the leadership of key CIS councils 
(which to this point have always been held by Russians -- in direct opposition to 
the charter) and for formalizing the dates of the Heads of State summits as the 
last ten days of March and October. 
 
During the meeting, President Yel'tsin decided not to address any of the 
prepared agenda items and instead pushed them all back to the prime ministers. 
According to Yel'tsin, the items were "not presidential issues." He went on to say 
that from now on, the heads of state would concentrate on solving "strategic 
issues" and said, "Documents which can be signed by premiers should be signed 
by premiers" (Infotag and ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-296). He then 
decided to schedule an "emergency session" of the council on 23 January 1998, 
at which these delegated issues will be reconsidered. 
 
This might reflect a new vision for how the organization is to work. Up until now, 
the bureaucracy worked very much like the Politburo -- only the top-most organ 
had the authority to make decisions. If Yel'tsin's decision takes hold, it may 
indicate that the concept of delegation might finally be taking root in Russia. On 
the other hand, this may be a move on Yel'tsin's part to divert some of the 
criticism for the failure of the CIS away from him personally. 
 
The issue of Russian/CIS peacekeeping forces in Georgia was discussed at the 
summit. During the run-up, Georgia indicated that it would ask for the troops to 
be withdrawn (as it has done for the past two summits). At the meeting, however, 
President Shevardnadze caved in and agreed to extend the unit's mandate until 
31 December (Interfax, 23 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-296). This is an arbitrary date 
because, as we have seen in the past, only the chairman of the Council of Heads 
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of State can decide to pull out the forces. Yel'tsin has been the chairman since 
the inception of the CIS and has said he won't make such a decision without 
consulting the other leaders (at a CIS summit). Since the next council will not 
meet until late February, the status of the peacekeepers will once again become 
nebulous on 1 January 1998. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Mark Jones 
 
UKRAINE 
What time is it? 
President Kuchma was not happy with the decision of the Crimean Supreme 
Council to legalize a third time zone (Moscow time) on the peninsula and ordered 
the decision suspended. Kuchma issued a decree calling the act unconstitutional 
and stipulated that the issue of timekeeping was not within the purview of the 
Crimean Council (ITAR-TASS, 18 October 97; FBIS-TEN-97-291). 
 
BELARUS 
Dangerous liaisons 
Ivan Antanovich, the Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that 
Belarus intends to open an embassy in Tehran. Antanovich, in the capital on an 
official visit, said Belarus is keen to develop political, economic, and cultural links 
with Iran (Radio Minsk, 0800 GMT, 29 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-302). 
 
MOLDOVA 
So much for negotiations 
Last edition we reported on a power-sharing agreement worked out by Russia, 
Moldova, and the Dniestr republic. It seemed at that time that a base agreement 
would be signed by all parties and that contentious issues would be addressed in 
separate documents. It now seems that the upstarts in Tiraspol have different 
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ideas. Valery Litskai, the chief negotiator and secretary of state of the self-
proclaimed republic, said his leaders will not sign the document, worked out with 
the help of Russian Duma leader Seleznev, because it "went too far" (Basapress, 
17 Oct 1997; FBIS-SOV-97-291). There has been no official reaction from Russia 
or Moldova, but this action must be seen as a slap in the face to Seleznev. 
 
OSCE to Russia: Get out 
Niels Helveg Petersen, acting chair of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), called for "an immediate and complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from eastern Moldova" (Basapress, 17 Oct 1997; 
FBIS-SOV-97-291). In his opinion, the withdrawal would help stabilize the 
situation in Moldova and foster the resolution of the Dniester conflict. 
 
He just doesn't get it 
One thing that can be said for Dniestr leader Igor Smirnov is that he is persistent. 
Even though not a single CIS leader has recognized or endorsed his claim for a 
separate republic, and even though both the Russian and Ukrainian presidents 
continue to insist that Moldova will be treated as one country, Smirnov decided to 
petition all CIS leaders to have his "republic" admitted to the Commonwealth 
(Infotag, 23 Oct 1997; FBIS-SOV-97-296). 
 
Smirnov then blew an opportunity to discuss the matter with the very people who 
could help him at a pre-summit meeting with the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, 
and Moldova. Smirnov simply failed to show up. This did not please President 
Yel'tsin, who commented, "Igor Smirnov is having a birthday today, and this 
event seems more important for him than our meeting here." 
 
Carrots and sticks 
Russian Duma Chairman Gennadi Seleznev has found a way to pressure the 
Moldovan government into making concessions to the breakaway Dniestr region. 
Speaking to the Moldovan parliament, Seleznev said that unsettled relations 
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between Chisinau and Tiraspol hamper Russian-Moldovan cooperation and slow 
the ratification of the 1990 treaty on interstate relations. He went on to explain 
that some factions in the Russian Duma link the ratification of the treaty to 
"progress" in the Transdniestr settlement (Interfax, 29 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-
302). It may have been more honest for him to say, If you give in to Tiraspol, we 
will ratify the seven-year old agreement and pull our forces out of the region. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Uzbek officers back Col. Khudoiberdiev's attacks on Tajik forces 
Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiev has been held responsible for two recent 
assaults on Tajik government forces. The first one occurred on 16 October, when 
200 of Col. Khudoiberdiev's men attacked the Tajik Presidential Guard's 
headquarters in Dushanbe, killing 14 guardsmen and wounding 20. The 
operation was launched from camps set up near the Tajik villages of Kanori and 
Andjir, located approximately 10-15 km away from the Uzbek border (Interfax, 
1310 GMT, 28 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-301). 
 
The second assault was launched during the early morning of 26 October 1997, 
when armed detachments attacked the Gulkhos border post (manned by Tajik 
border troops and Presidential Guard forces), which is located in Tursunzoda 
District's Shirkent Gorge, 85 kilometers west of Dushanbe and close to the 
Uzbek-Tajik border. The attack began around 12:00 am, when the border post 
was assaulted from three sides with grenade launchers and machine guns, and 
continued for approximately four hours. Two border guards and nine Presidential 
Guard troops were killed during this raid (Interfax, 1443 GMT, 27 Oct 97; FBIS-
UMA-97-300). 
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Tajik government authorities believe that members of Uzbekistan's military 
leadership provided Col. Khudoiberdiev with support for this attack, based on the 
testimony of Kasim Babaev, the southern Khatlon Region administration's former 
deputy chief, and one of Col. Khudoiberdiev's closest associates, who voluntarily 
turned himself in to Tajik government forces prior to the attack on the border 
post. Babaev stated that he did not believe that the aid provided to Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's forces was sanctioned by the Uzbek government, but that it was 
an independent initiative, carried out by individual military officers. He also 
testified that Col. Khudoiberdiev's two previous operations against the Tajik 
government (in January-February 1996 and in August 1997) had received 
backing from these Uzbek officers. Following Col. Khudoiberdiev's unsuccessful 
attack on government forces last August, he and a number of his field 
commanders and troops (including Babaev) fled to Uzbekistan and remained 
there until 20 October. Upon entering Uzbekistan (via the South Shartuz sector 
on the Tajik side of the border), they were stopped by officers of the Uzbek 
border guard, who informed the colonel that although they did not have official 
permission to do so, they would permit him and his men to enter the country for a 
short period of time (ITAR-TASS, 0910 GMT, 27 Oct 97; FBIS-UMA-97-300). 
 
Led by Major-General Ghaffur Mirzoev, the Presidential Guard immediately 
launched an operation to locate and capture Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces. They 
spent two days searching the Shirkent Gorge and, according to Maj.-Gen. 
Mirzoev, managed to corner 200 of Col. Khudoiberdiev's men near the Uzbek 
border by 28 October (ITAR-TASS, 1455 GMT, 28 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-301). 
Maj.-Gen. Mirzoev also informed reporters that his troops had found the body of 
Tursunzade's ex-mayor and former Popular Front commander, Ibod Boimatov, 
on 28 October (Interfax, 1310 GMT, 28 Oct 97, FBIS-SOV-97-301). Ibod 
Boimatov was also an associate and ally of Col. Khudoiberdiev, and participated 
in the January-February 1996 anti-government operation, after which he is 
rumored to have fled to Afghanistan. The circumstances of his death are unclear. 
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As of 30 October, Tajik Presidential Guard commander Maj.-Gen. Mirzoev 
reported that most of Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces had been neutralized and that 
the situation in the Shirkent Gorge was under control. He also stated that about 
30 of the anti-government militia's men had been killed and 15 had been taken 
prisoner (Interfax, 1429 GMT, 30 Oct 97, FBIS-SOV-97-303). Maj.-Gen. 
Mirzoev's units have been able to obtain valuable information about Col. 
Khudoiberdiev's operations from the prisoners, although this information will not 
be released until the Presidential Guard's mission has been successfully 
concluded (Interfax, 0443 GMT, 28 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-301). Maj.-Gen. 
Mirzoev was able to tell journalists on 30 October that the prisoners had 
corroborated Kasim Babaev's claim that part of Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces were 
based in Uzbekistan and that some armed groups had also been hiding in the 
mountains of northwestern Tajikistan for a few months (Interfax, 1429 GMT, 30 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-303). 
 
The Uzbek government has denied any possibility of the existence of Tajik anti-
government militia bases on its territory. Uzbek officials began meeting with 
representatives of the Tajik government on 28 October to discuss ways of 
dealing with the armed insurgency on the Uzbek-Tajik border (Interfax, 0711 
GMT, 30 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-303). On 30 October, Moscow NTV reported that 
Uzbekistan's special services had offered their help in tracking down the 
remainder of Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces, and Tajik Security Minister Saidamir 
Zuhurov reported that a joint group of Tajik and Uzbek investigators had started 
work in Tashkent (NTV, 1100 GMT, 30 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-303). 
 
Moscow NTV also reported that a new round of fighting had broken out between 
Tajikistan's Presidential Guard and Col. Khudoiberdiev's armed groups in the 
Shirkent Gorge and that, according to military reconnaissance information, the 
insurgents were holding a number of the residents from the nearby village of 
Gulkhos hostage. The precise number of hostages was not yet known at the time 
of the report (NTV, 1100 GMT, 30 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-303). 
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In an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta on 31 October, Col. Mahmud 
Khudoiberdiev reported that his forces had repelled the Tajik Presidential Guard's 
attack. He also stated that he was ready to continue fighting for another ten 
years, if necessary, in order to exert pressure on the Tajik government to stop 
persecuting his supporters, and to accept his own return to Tajikistan (RFE/RL 
Newsline, Vol 1, No. 150, 31 Oct 97). 
 
Comment 
Kasim Babaev's testimony and the reports given by some of those captured by 
the Presidential Guard do seem to justify the Tajik government's suspicions that 
Col. Khudoiberdiev was receiving aid from forces in Uzbekistan. However, 
Babaev's testimony also raises many new questions. It is not yet clear just how 
much aid and funding the Uzbek officers supplied to Col. Khudoiberdiev, nor can 
we be sure at this point that he was the only Tajik military officer receiving this 
type of support. Another issue is whether Col. Khudoiberdiev has any significant 
ties to the Leninobod faction, which was excluded from power for the first time in 
decades when Russian military leaders appointed Emomali Rahmonov to head 
the government in 1992. In recent years, many residents of Leninobod Oblast' 
have expressed considerable sentiment against President Rahmonov's 
government, and in 1996 former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov founded 
the secular opposition party known as the National Revival Bloc. Abdullojonov 
requested representation for his party at the inter-Tajik peace negotiations, and 
his request was backed by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), but President 
Rahmonov refused to allow the National Revival Bloc to participate in the peace 
process, perhaps fearing the strength of a possible UTO-National Revival Bloc 
alliance. 
 
President Rahmonov may have also believed that the National Revival Bloc was 
created at least partly as a front for Uzbek interests in Tajikistan. Leninobod 
Oblast' is populated by a large Uzbek minority, and historically the Leninobod 
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political faction has had a close relationship with the Uzbek government. Thus, 
this leads one to wonder whether there are any connections between Col. 
Khudoiberdiev and the old Leninobod faction and whether he has any links to 
Abdumalik Abdullojonov and his National Revival Bloc. 
 
The Uzbek military officers' motives for backing Col. Khudoiberdiev would seem 
to be fairly clear at this point. They undoubtedly hope to regain some influence in 
the Tajik government by providing the colonel with enough support to enable him 
to force President Rahmonov to grant him a voice in Tajikistan's affairs, including 
the inter-Tajik peace process. Although it is unlikely that the Uzbek government 
sanctioned any of the officers' activities vis-a-vis Khudoiberdiev, it is also difficult 
to believe that President Karimov is completely ignorant of their actions. Should 
Col. Khudoiberdiev eventually prove to be successful in his endeavors against 
the Tajik government, we may see Uzbekistan's role in Tajik affairs grow again. 
Even if the colonel's efforts fail in their ultimate goal, he may be able to push 
Tajikistan into such a state of anarchy, that the Uzbek government will have no 
trouble asserting its influence in Tajikistan. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Yel'tsin officially offers security guarantee... 
In a meeting with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, Russian President 
Boris Yel'tsin officially offered a series of initiatives on security guarantees for the 
Baltic states. The offer of unilateral obligation by the Russian Federation would 
allow inter-state relations to "be based on a solid basis of mutual security and 
confidence," Yel'tsin said in Moscow on 24 October. (ITAR-TASS, 1346 GMT, 24 
Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-297) Baltic reaction was, for the most part, not surprising, 
although Brazauskas did say an advisory council on foreign policy--consisting of 
Brazauskas, Seimas Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, Foreign Minister Algirdas 
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Saudargas, Defense Minister Ceslovas Stankevicius, MP and head of the foreign 
policy committee Mecys Laurinkus, and presidential foreign adviser Neris 
Germanas--would look into the proposals. Later Landsbergis signalled the fate of 
the proposal, describing the offer as one that would make Lithuania a 
protectorate. However, the Seimas chairman did encourage Russia to announce 
additional friendly intentions, such as to refrain from attacking, to lift double 
customs duties, or to draw up a readmission treaty. (ELTA-Lithuanian News 
Agency, 27 Oct 97) As reactions to earlier Russian proposals had predicted, 
Brazauskas' Baltic colleagues did not welcome the idea of turning to Russia for 
security. Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis pointed out that his country had not 
requested any such security guarantee from Russia (Interfax, 0732 GMT, 26 Oct 
97; FBIS-SOV-97-299) and described the offer as "unacceptable" (ITAR-TASS, 
1331 GMT, 27 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-300). In a more softly worded rejection, an 
Estonian diplomat told Interfax that guarantees offered by one country would not 
be sufficient. (Interfax, 1046 GMT, 27 Oct 97; FBIS-SOV-97-300) Less diplomatic 
was Eino Tamm, chairman of the Riigikogu's Foreign Affairs Committee: "To a 
certain degree, such a statement may also be taken as Russia's endeavor to trap 
the Baltic states in its sphere of influence," he said. (Baltic News Service Daily 
Report, 1900 ZULU, 24 Oct 97) 
 
... while Baltic, US officials hammer out charter agreement 
At the same time that Baltic leaders were reviewing and rejecting Russia's 
promise of protection, US government officials were hard at work on the US-
Baltic Charter, which will offer no concrete security guarantees. The document, 
according to representatives of the National Security Council and the US State 
Department, is reportedly 99 percent complete and, while containing no 
guarantees, will have a strong statement on security and US support for the 
Baltic states to choose their own alliances. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 
1300 ZULU, 24 Oct 97) 
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Recommendations for treatment of non-citizens receive disparate 
responses 
After years of denying that Russian-speaking non-citizens faced any 
extraordinary difficulties living in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia (often in 
response to Russian saber rattling that such persons were suffering in the 
extreme), the governments of those two countries seem to have reached the 
point, with the help of outside observers, of reluctantly acknowledging that there 
may be some surmountable difficulties. The Estonian Cabinet agreed to extend 
the mandate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
in Tallinn for another year--a move which Danish Foreign Minister (and OSCE 
chairman) Niels Helveg Petersen described as a wise decision. (Baltic News 
Service Daily Report, 1600 ZULU, 23 Oct 97) This extension followed the 
acceptance of recommendations by OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities Max van der Stoel concerning naturalization and language teaching. 
After his 22 October meeting with the commissioner, Estonian Prime Minister 
Mart Siimann announced that his government would create the position of 
ombudsman to monitor the problems of non-Estonians and their integration. 
(Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 ZULU, 22 Oct 97) Earlier in the Fall 
Estonian President Lennart Meri had announced the easing of examination 
requirements. 
 
Van der Stoel's recommendations in Latvia did not encounter such a warm 
reception. The commissioner stressed the need to grant citizenship to children 
born in post-1991 Latvia, and the necessity to draft the state language law in 
accordance with international human rights organizations. Latvian President 
Guntis Ulmanis took umbrage at the recommendations, which he saw as 
targeting unfairly the Latvian state's autonomy. Such prodding from Europe, he 
said, "could create a feeling that we (Latvians) ourselves are not authorized to 
define a status of our native language." (DIENA, 30 Oct 97; LETA, Latvian 
National News Agency, 30 Oct 97) Controversy over the draft language law is not 
new; at least in part due to the voicing of concern by a number of European 
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states' ambassadors the previous week, the Saeima's education, research and 
culture committee had voted to send the draft law to European institutions such 
as the Council of Europe and the OSCE for examination before further legislative 
steps were taken. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 ZULU, 22 Oct 97) 
 
ESTONIA 
Military woes continue 
Relations between Defense Minister Andrus Oovel and the parliament's Defense 
Commission worsened when the minister announced at the end of the committee 
meeting that he didn't take the commission seriously. [Baltic News Service Daily 
Report, 2100 ZULU, 23 Oct 97] The commission had expressed dissatisfaction 
with the government's investigation into the drowning of soldiers during a training 
exercise in September, and had suggested a few days earlier that Prime Minister 
Mart Siimann discharge Oovel. Refusing to heed the commission's 
recommendation, Siimann noted that, while there were issues needing to be 
addressed, "State defense problems cannot be reduced to two individuals' 
discharge, the problems are deeper ... ." He added that work to resolve the 
troubles was progressing. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 ZULU, 22 Oct 
97) 
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